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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WARREN M. O'GARA, Executor 
of the Estate of NANCY E. 
HIRIGARA Y, Deceased, 
Appellant, Case 
-vs.- No. 8527 
ARCHIE FINDLAY, 
Respondent 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The action in the lower Court was brought by the 
Executor of the Estate of Nancy E. Hi riga ray, deceased, for 
the purpose of setting aside a deed of conveyance to cer,. 
tain real property located in Davis County, Utah. The 
facts are as follows: the defendant, Archie Findlay, lives 
in Blackfoot, Idaho, and is a nephew of the deceased ... 
grantor; the deceased, Nancy E. Hirigaray, lived in Layton, 
Utah, until just before her death on January 12, 1955; in 
the early spring of 1949, the deceased wrote to Archie 
Findlay and asked him to come down to help her with 
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2 
her property (TRS 19 and 26); on April26, 1949, Archie 
Findlay came from Idaho and picked the deceased up in 
his car and they went together to the Barnes Banking 
Company, Kaysville, Utah, where the deceased executed 
a deed (Ex. A.), together with instructions as to how the 
property or its proceeds was to be divided upon her death 
(TRS 19 and 29); the deed and instructions were left at 
the Barnes Banking Company in an envelope marked 
"Nancy E. Hirigaray and Archie Findlay" (Ex. C.); on 
June 27, 1949, Hirigaray executed another set of instruc ... 
tions by which she eliminated two persons named in the 
first instructions (Ex. 1.) and picked up the first instruc ... 
tions (TRS 37 and 41); on July 11, 1952, Hirigaray went 
to the Barnes Banking Company and executed a new set 
of instructions (Ex. 2.), and then again on March 15, 
1954, Hirigaray again changed her instructions; on the 
day of the execution of the deed Hirigaray had Archie 
Findlay's name put on two savings accounts in two Salt 
Lake City Banks but subsequently put another person's 
name on the accounts and removed the name of Archie 
Findlay (TRS 22) ; after execution of the deed Archie 
Findlay returned to Idaho and did not see the deed or 
instructions again until after the death of Hirigaray in 
January, 1955. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SHOWS 
CLEARLY THAT THE GRANTOR ON THE DEED 
HAD A TEST AMENT ARY PLAN IN MIND AND 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY RE ... 
QUIREMENTS FOR A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSI ... 
TION. 
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The basic problem in this action is whether or not the 
plaintiff's decedent legally delivered a certain deed dated 
April 26, 1949, to the defendant so as to create in him 
a then present interest; or whether the decedent really 
intended to create a testamentary plan of distribution of 
this property, which plan must fail because it did not 
conform to the statutory requirements for such plans. 
The law of our state in this field is succinctly stated in 
the recent case of First Security Bank v. Burgi -U-, 251 
P2d 297 ( 1952) which reads in part as follows: 
" ( 1) Delivery is essentially a matter involving 
intent, and such intent is to be arrived at from the 
facts and surrounding circumstances, both before 
and after the date of the deed, including declara ... 
tions of alleged grantor where it appears the decla ... 
rations are made fairly and in ordinary course of 
life." 
(2) Where father executing deed and bill of 
sale in favor of son intended that deed and bill of 
sale were to become operative only upon death of 
father, the deed and bill of sale were testamentary 
in character and intent and were inoperative for 
failure to conform to statutory requirements for 
testamentary disposition.'' 
This action is brought by the Executor of the alleged 
grantor's estate for the purpose of bringing the property 
within the estate and under the jurisdiction of the probate 
court. The defendant did not pay anything for the property. 
He testified that the decedent asked him to do her a favor 
and he said that he would do so. (TRS 19 and 26). The 
defendant and decedent went to her bank where a Mr. 
Gailey was instructed to prepare a deed form. The decedent 
said that she wanted to make a deed to defendant and that 
he was to sell the land any time after her death and distri ... 
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bute the money to certain designated persons. Even at the 
time of trial, defendant did not pretend that there was 
any other purpose but to sell the property after decedent's 
death and make distribution in accordance with her in.-
structions (TRS 19, 24, 25 and 2 7) . The deed was put in 
an envelope marked (among other things) with the two 
names "Nancy E. Hirigaray and Archie Findlay." A sepa .. 
rate sheet of instructions as to the distribution of the pro.. 
ceeds of the sale of her property after her death was also 
included in the envelope with the deed. After the deed 
was signed and left at the Barnes Banking Company, 
Kaysville, Utah, the defendant went back to his home in 
Idaho and did not discuss the matter of the property with 
decedent again, nor did he inquire at the bank about the 
deed until almost a month after decedents death on Janu .. 
ary 10, 1955, when he obtained the deed and had it re--
corded. During the almost six years between the signing 
of the deed and its recordation decedent rented the farm 
lands, and collected rents, paid the taxes, and did not 
even discuss the deed or property with defendant. Further, 
the decedent continued to live on the premises and did 
all things in relation to said premises to the same extent as 
she had done previous to the signing of the deed and gave 
no indication of giving up the premises or ceasing to treat 
it as her own during her lifetime. 
From the time the deed \Vas made until the time of 
trial the defendant, Archie Findlay did not claim any in--
terest in the real estate. The whole object of his participa.-
tion in this matter was to accommodate Hirigaray in execut ... 
ing a testamentary plan of distribution of the Hirigaray 
estate. Just before Hirigaray went to the hospital on \vhat 
proved to be her final illness Archie Findlay talked to her 
in order "to get it all straightened out as to how she \Vanted 
everything divided, the household furniture and stuff, so 
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there would be no argument about it later" (TRS 25). 
It was in July, 1952, that Hirigaray rewrote her instruc ... 
tions as to the distribution of her estate at which time Ar--
chie Findlay appears as a distributee for the first time (Ex. 
2). The written instructions have an appearance and lan--
guage much like that of a codicil to a will - they are 
testamentary in tone. 
On June 27, 1949, the decedent went to the Barnes 
Banking Company and made a set of instructions which 
reads in part: 
"After my death said Archie Findlay was to 
dispose of the property and divided the proceeds 
of sale among several others that are mentioned 
on a statement made by me on 26th of April, 1949. 
Since that time I have given cash to Mrs. Mabel 
Timothy and Myrtle Schofield, and for that rea ... 
son they are to not have any share of proceeds 
coming from the sale of real estate and improve .... 
ments and the total shall be divided among the 
others mentioned in said statement of April 26, 
1949." 
At the time of trial the original instruction sheet could 
not be produced and its loss being explained by Mr. Gailey 
to the effect that Mrs. Hirigaray picked it up on June 27, 
1949 (TRS 37). 
On July 11, 1952, decedent went to her bank and 
had a new set of instructions prepared which read in part 
as follows: 
"The understanding that I have is that at my 
death he is to dispose of the property and the pro .... 
ceeds from sale to be divided among the following 
persons: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
To Mrs. Ann Jensen of Blackfoot, Idaho, three 
hundred dollars; Josephine Avery of Layton, Utah, 
five hundred dollars; to Margaret Nord three hun ... 
dred dollars; the remainder to be divided equally 
among the following named persons: Archie Find ... 
lay of Blackfoot, Idaho, William Findlay of Black ... 
foot, Idaho, George Findlay of Blackfoot, Idaho, 
Mattie Miles of Blackfoot, Idaho, Mrs. Ruth Wil ... 
kinson, all of the above being nephews or nieces 
of mine, also Arthur Findlay of Layton, Utah, 
Stephen T. Findlay of Clearfield, Utah, and Parley 
Findlay of Ogden, Utah. In the event that either 
of the above die before I do then if they leave any 
issue their share to be divided among the children 
of deceased." 
On March 15, 1954, the decedent altered her instruc ... 
tions as follows: 
"March 15, 1954. Ben Nord is now dead and 
for that reason I ask that his share be divided 
equally qmong the others mentioned. That is what 
he would have received to be divided among others 
as tho he had not been mentioned at all." 
The testimony of Mr. Gailey and the defendant did 
not disclose any statement of decedent contrary to the 
written words of these various instruction sheets (TRS 45). 
Defendant candidly admits that decedent told him he 
could sell the property "anytime after her death." 
A review of the evidence of this case creates and com ... 
pels the inesapable conclusion that the decedent had a testa ... 
mentary plan and intent in mind when she executed the 
deed on April 26, 1949. It is fitting and proper that the 
Court declare the decedent's deed null and void and that 
the property be delivered to plaintiff to be distributed in ac ... 
cordance vvith the orderly and protective procedures of 
the probate jurisdiction of our Courts. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO THE TESTIMONY AS 
TO WHAT WAS SAID TO THE GRANTOR AT THE 
TIME THE DEED WAS MADE. 
The problem under this point concerns the evidence 
appearing on page 28 of the transcript and similar evi ... 
dence appearing on page 36 of the transcript. On page 28, 
Archie Findlay was being examined by Rex Hardy as 
follows: 
Q. Now at the time you were in the bank was there 
any discussion about the delivery of this particular deed? 
A. Yes, Mr. Gailey explained it to her. 
Q. Do you recall what he stated? 
Mr. Lowe: I object to the explanation of a third 
party, inadmissable, not being the statement of the 
deceased or grantor and it certainly would be hear ... 
say, this man is not a party. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
Later a motion was made to strike all of the testimony 
along this· vein (TRS 30). Objection was also made to 
similar testimony by Mr. Gailey (TRS 36). 
This situation comes squarely within the prohibition 
of our "dead man statute" Section 78..-24..-2 (3), UCA 1953. 
Maxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 U. 280, 172 P2d 122 
Sine v. Harper, ________ u ________ , 222 P2d 571 
The testimony of Mr. Gailey would not be inadmis..-
sable, perhaps, under the "dead man statute" but was a 
unilateral statement involving a conclusion of law to which 
there was no reply by Hirigaray. On page 45 of the trans .. 
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cript Rex Hardy was cross ... examining Mr. Gailey concern ... 
ing the conversations at the time the deed was prepared. 
The following appears: 
Q. At the time that this conversation was taking place 
did Mrs. Hirigaray make any statement indicating her 
understanding as to the need of delivering the deed? 
A. I didn't get the last part. 
Q. The Court: Did she make any statement to you? 
Q. Mr. Hardy: Which would lead you to know, or 
indicate what her understanding was? 
A. No. She did not! 
At the very best this evidence is only admissable as an 
admission by silence. The law provides that such evidence 
is admissable only when it is a statement of fact (and not 
a conclusion of law) and when the statement is heard 
and understood by the person whose interest is affected. 
31 Corpus Juris Secundum 1057,1060. 
The evidence in this case falls far short of being an 
admission by silence. The evidence shows that at the very 
time of the deed another written instrument provided 
that "after her death the property was to be sold and 
divided among certain people. Hirigaray exercised her con ... 
trol over the property by naming new distributees and 
eliminating others upon three subsequent occasions. If Mrs. 
Hirigaray considered that she could change the distributees 
at her pleasure and eliminate some (or all), then she cer ... 
tainly did not intend to relinquish title and control when 
the deed. was made. 
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CONCLUSION 
Certainly the weight of the evidence is to the effect 
that the deceased had a testamentary plan in mind at 
the time the deed was made, and thus it should be held 
to be void in order that the property be made a part of 
the decedents estate and be distributed under the orderly 
processes of the Courts. It is easy to see that should the 
defendant fail to comply with the express will of Mrs. 
Hirigaray as contained in her various written instructions, 
then a number of Court actions would probably ensue. 
The decision of the lower Court should be reversed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
PETER M. LOWE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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